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Critical Infrastructure 
• Consists of assets and systems which are 
essential in maintaining vital societal functions 
• For example electricity generation, 
telecommunication, water supply, 
transportation systems and financial services 
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Critical Infrastructure (2) 
• Critical infrastructure has become a 
noteworthy field of contemporary research 
• Various methods and formalisms have been 
studied:  
– Graphs 
– Bayesian belief networks 
– Neural networks 
– Etc. 
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Roots of entropy 
• The concept of entropy in thermodynamics 
was invented by Rudolf Clausius in 1850s 
• The term entropy comes from the Greek word 
τρoπή, "transformation” 
• In 1948 Claude E. Shannon proposed a 
information theoretic view of entropy in his 
paper ”A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication” 
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The definition of entropy 
• For a random variable X we define its entropy 
to be 
 H(X):=-∑P(X=x)log P(X=x), 
where x goes through all possible states of X 
• Entropy is the expected value of information 
associated to a single event: 
 H(X)=E(-log P(X)) 
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The definition of entropy (2) 
• Information is usually measured in bits (a.k.a. 
shannons) 
• 1 bit = 1 coin flip 
• Entropy of an event can be thought of as a 
measure of uncertainty: 
 hard to predict = high entropy 
 easy to predict = low entropy 
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DiSCI and SACIN 
• This work is part of a larger research project, 
called Digital Security of Critical 
Infrastructures (DiSCI) 
• Aim is to find solutions to control critical 
infrastructure threats on a national level 
• Situational Awareness of Critical Infrastructure 
and Networks (SACIN) software framework 
was developed for monitoring critical 
infrastructure  
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Modelling critical infrastructure 
• In situational awareness, we are mainly 
interested in critical infrastructure health and 
degree of operational capability 
• The model should reflect this line of thought 
• No exessive specifics about the systems 
should be included  
• Flexible and extensible structure 
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Critical infrastructure system (CIS) 
• Combines graphs and finite state machines 
• Directed graph represents dependency 
relations 
• Finite state machines (on nodes) can 
represent a facility, process or service  
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Example state diagram 
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Event causes transition 
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State change 
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State machines coupled 
Markus Klemetti, Samir Puuska 
Sotatekniikan laitos 
MPKK 14.10.15 14 
Markus Klemetti, Samir Puuska 
Sotatekniikan laitos 
MPKK 14.10.15 15 
Markus Klemetti, Samir Puuska 
Sotatekniikan laitos 
MPKK 
Status function 
• Attached to each finite state machine in the 
graph is a status function S: Q  [0,1], where 
– Q is the set of states of the machine 
– For each state q in Q, the number S(q) 
represents its severity, 0 implying the machine 
is not operational and 1 implying that the 
machine is fully operational. 
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Implementing time and probabilities 
• In this work we expand the critical 
infrastructure system model by associating a 
probability distribution to each node of the 
graph 
• For simplicity we assume that sensor 
readings are always accurate 
• Let M be a finite state machine that has states 
operational (O), marginally operational (M) 
and non-operational (N), with (previously 
observed) probabilities a, b and c, 
respectively. 
 
Markus Klemetti, Samir Puuska 
Sotatekniikan laitos 
MPKK 
Implementing time and probabilities 
(2) 
• Let X denote the state of the finite state 
machine M. At first we assume that X follows 
the default probability distribution 
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Implementing time and probabilities 
(3) 
• In case we get a sensor reading N, we define 
the new probability distribution for X as 
follows:  
•  
 
 
where t denotes time elapsed since the event 
and k is a constant defined by the operator 
(k>0). 
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Implementing time and probabilities 
(4) 
• This way we get a probability that takes into 
account the uncertainty that occurs due to the 
passage of time. 
• The initial probabilities a, b and c may have 
been collected by observing the operation of 
the sensor for a longer time period, or they 
may have been defined by the sensor 
operator.  
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Implementing time and probabilities 
(5) 
More generally, Let M be a finite state machine with 
states A1, A2,…,An and initial probabilities a1, 
a2,…,an, respectively. If we get a sensor reading Aj, 
we define the new probability distribution for X as 
follows: 
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Entropy in critical infrastructure 
systems 
• By calculating the expected value E(S(X)), it 
is possible to estimate the status of the 
system in question. 
• The entropy of the random variable X informs 
us of the reliability of the estimate (lower 
entropy being more reliable). 
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Entropy in critical infrastructure 
system (2) 
• There is no need to calculate any conditional 
probabilities. The causalities are taken into 
account by the underlying finite state machine 
structure. 
• Setting up the system should be 
straightforward: Each finite state machine 
only requires  
– the initial probability distribution, 
– the constant k in the new distribution,  
– severity values between 0 and 1 for its states.  
Markus Klemetti, Samir Puuska 
Sotatekniikan laitos 
MPKK 14.10.15 24 
Markus Klemetti, Samir Puuska 
Sotatekniikan laitos 
MPKK 
Example 
• Let A be a power plant and B be a radio tower. They each 
have states ”OK”, ”damaged” and ”offline”. The initial 
probabilities for A are 
  0.7 for OK 
 0.2 for damaged 
 0.1 for offline 
• The initial probabilities for B are 
 0.5 for OK 
 0.45 for damaged 
 0.05 for offline  
• In the beginning both A and B are known to be OK. 
• When time=100 we get a sensor reading that A is damaged. 
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“Although our intellect always longs for clarity 
and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty 
fascinating.”  
― Carl von Clausewitz 
 
“You should call it entropy, because nobody 
knows what entropy really is, so in a debate you 
will always have the advantage.” 
 — John Neumann, suggestion to Claude Shannon on what to 
call his new formula for information 
